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15 June 1983
14

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DOW-16

Weekly Activities and Status Report for DD/ICS--15 June 1983

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CIPC Organizational Activities

- The monthly Committee meeting will be on 20 June at 1030 hours. The agenda has been developed (attached) and will be forwarded, by special courier, to the members along with other background material on Wednesday P.M./Thursday A.M.
- John Guenther, USMC, reported that he would be attending the 20 June meeting; however, he will be delivering a letter appointing BGEN Smith as the primary CIPC member and Guenther would be the alternate, effective immediately.
- We have taken a straw poll on the feasibility of continuing a Monthly Activities and Status Report for the Committee members. This report would be in addition to the minutes and not a substitute for meetings. The report would, however, provide the members an insight into some of the staff activities not discussed at meetings. There appears to be overwhelming support to continue the report. (Straw poll attached.)

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Personnel

- [] CIA Career Trainee, recently visited us and expressed a desire to fulfill her final interim (three months) on the CIPC staff. She has discussed this possibility with her program coordinator, [] and he wholeheartedly concurs. [] is presently working in DDO/NESA on OPEC issues. She knows the D/ICS--she attended [] and joined the Agency as a result of his recommendation. We have talked to both [] and her DDO supervisor and, with your concurrence, would like to invite her to join us for her final CT tour. She is slated for DDI SOVA upon completion of the CT program.
- [] has been security-approved as of 10 June 1983. However, Contract Personnel has not yet received this notification but when they do the processing will be completed. With luck we should have [] on board in a few days.

Orientation Briefings and Visits

- On 13 June, [] were briefed by COMIREX staff on future imagery exploitation planning.
- On 15 June, NPIC is scheduled to brief CIPC staff on present imagery capabilities to []
- [] is off to Brookings for the week.

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Intelligence Collection Activities Against China: []

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- We have now received responses from all of the CIPC members. [] is reviewing these responses and will be providing us within a week a recommendation on how next to proceed. This subject is a candidate agenda item for the July meeting.

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Imagery Exploitation Planning

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- As noted earlier, the CIPC staff was briefed by the COMIREX staff on 13 June. Their briefing indicated that considerable exploitation planning is under way at the national level and in various stages. However, we plan to continue looking into this matter, and several tutorial briefings and visits are being scheduled. We will be visiting NPIC in the near future.

Chemical Warfare Study: []

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- We have been in contact with ACDA and STIC regarding this subject and have advised them we are presently exploring what might be done by the CIPC in response to their request. [] has had conversation with various experts around town and has scheduled a briefing by NPIC on imagery applicability to this subject. [] is also developing a recommended course of action for the CIPC and we should have this ready by next week.

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Narcotics Projects and Activities: []

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- The Working Group met on 14 June and, among other things, reviewed the staff recommendation resulting from our trip to Miami. These recommendations will be tabled at the Committee meeting on 20 June.

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- The recent GAO report is being closely reviewed. It contains some very interesting recommendations. (Executive Summary attached.)


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- The Miami trip report is in final preparation (preliminary copy attached).



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Distribution:

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DCI/ICS/ES/CIPC: (15Jun83)

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

DCI/ICS 83-3802
CIPC A-03

Preliminary Agenda
MONTHLY MEETING*
20 June 1983, 1030 Hours

ATTACHMENT

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- | | | | |
|--|------------|--|------|
| I. OPENING REMARKS/ANNOUNCEMENTS | (5 Mins.) | Chairman | |
| II. BRIEFING ON THE INTELLIGENCE PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS | (35 Mins.) | | |
| - Organization | | Chief, Arms Control, Intelligence Staff, CIA | 25X1 |
| - Key Issues | | | |
| III. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS COORDINATION AND COLLECTION STUDY | (40 Mins.) | Working Group Chairman | |
| - Status Report | | Members | |
| - Review and Discussion | | | |
| Overview of CIPC Staff Visits to EPIC and South Florida Task Force (SFTF) | | | 25X1 |
| - Discussion: Selected Issues | | Chairman/Members | |
| IV. STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE STUDY | (30 Mins.) | Working Group Chairman/Members | 25X1 |
| - Status Report | | | |
| - Review and Discussion | | | |
| V. OTHER BUSINESS | (10 Mins.) | Chairman/Executive Secretary | 25X1 |
| - Monthly Report for the Members | | | |
| - Chairman's Notes | | | |

Executive Secretary

*Attendance is limited to Principal Members or designated Alternate.

**Classification of briefing.

Note: If you have questions regarding the Agenda or attendance, please contact the Executive Secretary on

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS

FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION
EFFORTS NEED STRONG CENTRAL
OVERSIGHT

D I G E S T

Drug abuse in this country is a persistent and growing problem. Interdiction of illegal drugs, one component of Federal efforts to reduce the drug supply, has had limited impact on the drug flow. Despite increasing resources for interdiction, only a small percentage of drugs entering this country are seized.

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

GAO conducted this review because of the significant increases in resources devoted to drug interdiction programs and because of the continuing vast amounts of drugs smuggled into the country. GAO's objectives were to evaluate the results of interdiction programs, the extent of cooperation and coordination among the various agencies, the role of intelligence in interdiction efforts, and the ability of the military to assist in drug interdiction.

INTERDICTION--ONE PART OF
THE FEDERAL DRUG STRATEGY

Federal efforts to attack the supply of illegal drugs have three major components: international programs aimed at drug-producer countries, interdiction of drugs at the border, and domestic law enforcement.

Federal interdiction efforts include inspections of international travelers and cargo by the U.S. Customs Service inspectors, air and marine interdiction efforts of Customs patrol officers, and sea interdiction by the U.S. Coast Guard. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) supports interdiction through the provision of intelligence and by investigating and presenting interdiction cases to U.S. attorneys. (See pp. 4 to 7.)

ATTACHMENT

INTERDICTION RESULTS REMAIN LIMITED

Federal resources devoted to drug interdiction more than tripled from 1977 to 1982--from \$83 million to \$278 million. The Coast Guard's drug interdiction program comprises the majority of this increase. Meanwhile, funds for other facets of the Federal drug supply reduction program--international drug activities and domestic law enforcement--remained relatively constant. (See pp. 11 to 13.)

Despite these increases, only 16 percent of the marijuana and less than 10 percent¹ of heroin, cocaine, and dangerous drugs that are entering this country are seized through total drug enforcement efforts. Also, 95 percent of the individuals arrested in interdiction cases are low level violators and when convicted usually spend less than a year in jail. (See pp. 14 to 19.)

Joint special projects conducted by two or more agencies have proven especially effective in attacking drug smuggling. Of particular note are special DEA investigations that involve Customs and the Coast Guard resources. (See pp. 19 to 26.)

PROGRAM FRAGMENTATION LIMITS EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION EFFORTS

The authority and responsibility for Federal drug interdiction efforts are split among three separate agencies in three executive departments. Each agency has different programs, goals, and priorities. And, although the level of cooperation is increasing, especially in South Florida, such fragmentation has a certain amount of inefficiency and interagency conflict built in. (See pp. 30 to 32.)

¹These and other such estimates in the report were developed by GAO analysis of Customs, DEA, and National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee data.

Congressional oversight and executive branch resource allocation decisions relative to drug interdiction are difficult under these circumstances. The budgets of the three agencies are developed in separate departments, reviewed by different OMB branches, and funds are authorized and appropriated by separate congressional committees. Also, very little information is available, either by agency or in the aggregate that can be used as a basis for evaluating program results. Aggregate seizure statistics are sometimes overstated when there is more than one participating agency, and very little case disposition information on arrestees is maintained. (See pp. 33 to 39.)

Another issue related to program fragmentation is the lack of a definitive policy regarding followup investigations of interdiction cases. Under the current division of responsibilities, DEA conducts followup investigations on the Coast Guard's or Customs' arrestees. DEA usually performs followup investigations only if the cases (less than 40 percent) will be prosecuted by a U.S. attorney. Consequently, information which could be of value to future investigations is not being obtained on the majority of the interdiction cases. (See pp. 39 to 46.)

Fragmentation of Federal efforts has long been recognized as a major problem. To help remedy this situation, Congress passed legislation in 1972 and 1976 that requires the President to develop a comprehensive national drug strategy and to appoint a drug abuse policy coordinator. While various drug strategies have been prepared over the years, the most recent in October 1982, none has adequately defined the various agencies' drug interdiction roles. Furthermore, the drug abuse policy coordinator has never had the authority to exercise the necessary policy and priority-setting oversight of Federal drug efforts. (See pp. 46 to 51.)

The current administration has organized or proposed several new groups to help coordinate Federal drug efforts. The South Florida Task Force, under the direction of Vice President Bush, was an excellent example of a cooperative

effort by all the major Federal agencies involved in drug enforcement efforts. While these efforts have certainly improved operational coordination among the various agencies, these coordination mechanisms still do not provide a composite picture of all Federal resources devoted to drug enforcement or provide a basis for allocating these resources in terms of budgetary priorities. (See pp. 51 to 53.)

BETTER, MORE TIMELY
INTELLIGENCE NEEDED

The effectiveness of Federal interdiction efforts depends a great deal on intelligence support capabilities. Statistics on the use of prior intelligence to support interdiction, as well as certain special projects, indicate the value of good, timely intelligence. (See pp. 57 to 59.)

Drug source and transit countries are valuable sources of intelligence that can be used to support interdiction efforts. However, Customs and Coast Guard must rely on DEA to provide this intelligence. Yet, the international programs of DEA and the Department of State do not place a high priority on supporting interdiction efforts. For example, a stronger intelligence program is needed in the Caribbean, a major transit area for drug smuggling. (See pp. 59 to 62.)

DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard all have domestic intelligence programs, and some intelligence processing and analysis has been centralized at the El Paso Intelligence Center. The Center can be more effective if better supported and utilized by the agencies involved in drug interdiction. Moreover, certain Customs and Coast Guard intelligence analysis functions should be transferred to the Center. (See pp. 62 to 69.)

MILITARY ASSISTANCE
INCREASING

The military departments have provided some limited assistance to drug enforcement agencies over the last several years. Changes to the

Posse Comitatus Act in December 1981, which further defined the extent of allowable military involvement in support of civilian law enforcement, have resulted in a greater role for military resources in drug interdiction. (See pp. 73 to 79.)

Although military assistance can be beneficial, it is also necessarily limited because

- major long-term commitments of military assistance can adversely impact the military's primary mission;
- military equipment is expensive to operate and, for the most part, reimbursement is beyond the financial capabilities of law enforcement agencies; and
- disclosure of classified military systems in court might be required and this could compromise national security. (See pp. 79 to 86.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO recommends that the President

- direct the development of a more definitive Federal drug strategy that stipulates the roles of the various agencies with drug enforcement responsibilities and
- make a clear delegation of responsibility to one individual to oversee Federal drug enforcement programs. (See p. 54.)

This report also contains a number of recommendations to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Attorney General; and the Secretaries of Treasury, Transportation, and State to accumulate drug enforcement budgeting data, develop a management information system, and strengthen drug interdiction intelligence efforts. (See pp. 53, 54, and 70.)

AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S EVALUATION

The Departments of Justice, Treasury, Transportation, State, and Defense provided written

comments on the draft report. The draft report was discussed with OMB officials. The White House Office of Policy Development and the Office of Drug Abuse Policy elected not to comment on the draft.

With respect to GAO's recommendations to the President, the Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations; the Departments of Treasury, State, and Defense did not specifically comment on the recommendations; and the Department of Justice disagreed.

The Department of Justice pointed out a series of actions taken by the Administration toward achieving a coordinated national drug investigative effort. The Department stated that current efforts by the Administration, such as the South Florida Task Force and the President's creation of 12 new Drug Enforcement Task Forces, are intended to foster even closer Federal agency coordination. The Department of Justice also noted that legislation to create an "Office of the Director of National and International Drug Operations and Policy" was passed by the 97th Congress. President Reagan withheld his approval of this legislation noting that such a drug program manager would create a new bureaucracy in the Executive Branch and compound the problems of coordination.

GAO believes, however, that the current arrangements do not provide a mechanism for optimizing coordination and implementing priorities for the allocation of limited Federal drug enforcement resources within and across all components of the Federal drug effort. Giving one individual the responsibility to oversee the entire Federal drug program, as GAO has recommended, would be an extension of the efforts to increase coordination already begun by the agencies. Such responsibility, however, should not extend to the day-to-day operations of the individual agencies, because each agency is best capable of managing its particular functions within the context of its overall agency mission.

Legislation to establish a drug operations and policy office, similar to that passed by the

Congress last year, has been introduced in the 98th Congress (S. 406). Although GAO has not specifically analyzed this legislation, GAO's findings support the concept of central drug oversight, which is a major objective of the legislation.

The Department's of Justice and Transportation supported GAO's recommendation to develop a management information system. The Department of the Treasury did not specifically comment on this recommendation. The Department of Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendation to accumulate drug enforcement budgetary data. Other agencies and departments did not comment on this recommendation. The Departments of Treasury, Transportation, Justice, and State pointed out in their comments that development of intelligence is important to an interdiction program. However, some of these agencies disagreed on how to improve the intelligence programs.

The agencies' detailed comments on all of GAO's recommendations are included in appendixes VIII through XII and GAO's analysis is presented in relevant sections of the report and at the ends of chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5.

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